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Abstract. Inanimate explanation is to be analysed in terms of substances having 
powers and liabilities to exercise their powers under certain conditions; while 
personal explanation is to be analysed in terms of persons, their beliefs, pow-
ers, and purposes. A crucial criterion for an explanation being probably true is 
that it is (among explanations leading us to expect the data) the simplest one. 
Simplicity is a matter of few substances, few kinds of substances, few properties 
(including powers and liabilities), few kinds of properties, and mathematically 
simple relations between properties. Explanation of the existence of the uni-
verse by the agency of God provides the simplest kind of personal explanation 
there can be, and one simpler than any inanimate explanation. I defend this 
view more thoroughly than previously in light of recent challenges.
THE TWO KINDS OF EXPLANATION1
I have argued over many years that theism provides a probably true ex-
planation of the existence and most general features of the universe.2 
A major reason for this, I have claimed, is that it is simpler than other 
1 Th is paper is being published simultaneously with its publication here in Anthony 
O’Hear (ed.), Philosophical Essays on Religion, Cambridge University Press (on behalf of 
the Royal Institute of Philosophy), with the kind agreement of the Institute.
2 Th is paper is dependent on much earlier writing of mine, especially Th e Christian 
God (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) chs 6 and 7, Epistemic Justifi cation (Oxford: Claren-
don Press, 2001), ch 4, and ‘How the Divine Properties Fit together: Reply to Gwiazda’, 
Religious Studies 45 (2009), 495-8. Th e latter paper was a reply to Jeremy Gwiazda, 
‘Richard Swinburne’s Argument to the Simplicity of God via the Infi nite’, Religious 
Studies 45 (2009), 487-93. I am grateful to Jeremy Gwiazda whose criticism of 
earlier views of mine helped me to formulate the view presented in this paper.
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explanations.3 Th e present paper seeks to amplify and defend this latter 
claim in the light of some recent challenges.
Explanatory hypotheses are of two kinds – inanimate (or scientifi c) 
and personal. In inanimate explanation we explain an event by means 
of an initial condition (or cause) C and a regularity or law of nature 
(N), such that these together necessitate or render probable the result-
ing event (E). To take a trivial example, we explain a given piece of iron 
expanding (E) by ‘the iron was heated’ (C) and ‘all iron expands when 
heated’ (N). We explain Mars being where it is today in terms of where it 
and the sun were yesterday and on previous days (C) and Kepler’s three 
laws of motion (N) which together entail it being where it is today (E). 
In personal explanation we explain by means of a person (S) with cer-
tain powers (P), beliefs (B) and purposes (G). By a ‘purpose’ I mean an 
intention in what the person is doing; an intentional action is an action 
of bringing about what the person has the purpose of bringing about. 
We explain my hand moving (E) by means of me (S), having the power 
to move my hand (P), having the purpose of getting your attention (G) 
and believing that causing my hand to move will do that (B). And we 
explain people’s purposes in terms of their desires (D) and beliefs (B). By 
a ‘desire’ I understand a kind of liability with which we fi nd ourselves to 
form certain purposes which render it probable that we will form those 
purposes. Among our beliefs we have moral beliefs about what is good 
to do. Moral beliefs motivate us, incline us to do the relevant action, but 
they may not motivate us as strongly as non-rational desires. So some-
times we have to choose between forming a purpose involving yielding 
to a desire to do what is bad, or a purpose involving pursuing the good 
despite contrary desire.
Th ere are however two diff erent ways of construing inanimate ex-
planation, depending on what laws of nature are, that is what are we 
claiming in claiming that ‘all iron expands when heated’ or (perhaps 
more realistically) ‘all photons travel at velocity c in vacuo relative to all 
inertial frames’ are laws of nature. We can, I think, these days quickly 
dismiss the Humean account that they are just assertions about what in 
fact happens: each bit of iron when heated in the past did expand, and 
3 See for example, my Th e Existence of God, second edition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
2004), chs 3 and 5.
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each bit when heated in future will expand. For there is a physical neces-
sity in the operation of laws of nature not captured by Hume’s account. 
Th at leaves two serious possibilities. Th e fi rst is that laws are real things 
separate from the substances (physical objects), things which determine 
how those substances behave. Th e currently discussed version of this is 
the view that laws are relations between universals (that is properties 
which may be instantiated in many diff erent substances); ‘iron’, ‘expand-
ing’ and ‘being heated’ are universals tied together (and that has to be 
construed as tied together in a Platonic heaven) such that when you in-
stantiate ‘iron’ and ‘being heated’ you inevitably instantiate ‘expanding’. 
I shall call this view, advocated by Armstrong and others4, the RBU (rela-
tions between universals) account. And so we explain the behaviour of 
a particular substance by something outside itself which determines also 
the behaviour of other substances – e.g. other pieces of iron. Th e alterna-
tive view is the substances – powers – and liabilities account (SPL). Th is 
was the normal view in ancient and medieval thought, and versions of it 
have been recently advocated by Harré and Madden and by Brian Ellis.5 
On the SPL account the fundamental laws of nature are causal laws; and 
these are generalizations, not (as Hume supposed) about what in fact 
happens, but about the causal powers of substances of a certain kind and 
their liabilities (either with physical necessity or with a certain physical 
probability) to exercise them. Th us ‘all iron expands when heated’ be-
ing a law of nature is a matter of every piece of iron having the power to 
expand and the liability (with physical necessity) to do so when heated. 
Kepler’s laws are generalisations about the powers of planets to move in 
certain ways and their liabilities to do so under certain circumstances. 
It is a contingent matter that things fall into a few kinds distinguished 
4 See D.M. Armstrong, What is a Law of Nature? (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 1983); Michael Tooley, ‘Th e Nature of Laws’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 7 
(1977), 667-98; and F.I.Dretske, ‘Laws of Nature’, Philosophy of Science 44 (1977), 248-68. 
Armstrong construes universals in an Aristotelian way (that is, as existing only when in-
stantiated). But that will not explain why their fi rst instantiation had the character it did, 
e.g why the fi rst piece of iron expanded when heated. Th at could only be explained if the 
universals were already tied together, and that would involve their existing before being 
instantiated, and so in a ‘Platonic heaven’.Th is latter is the view of Tooley, and it is in his 
way that I have spelled out the RBU account.
5 R. Harré and E.H. Madden, Causal Powers (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1975); Brian 
Ellis, Scientifi c Essentialism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
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by their powers and liabilities as well as by other properties. Th is ul-
timately derives from the fact that their constituents are fundamental 
particles (substances, such as electrons and quarks) which fall into a very 
few kinds distinguished from each other by their mass, charge, spin etc; 
these latter being – at least in part – analysable in terms of the powers 
and liabilities possessed by the particles .
Although I think that the main argument of this paper can be phrased 
in terms of either account of inanimate explanation, in order not to make 
the paper too long, I am now going to make the assumption that the SPL 
account is the correct account. One quick reason for rejecting RBU, is 
the implausibility of a Platonic heaven containing universals infl uencing 
the behaviour of mundane things. Another reason is that it enables us to 
give a more unifi ed account of explanation6. For, given SPL, all explana-
tion, inanimate and personal, now involves substances (either persons 
or inanimate things) and their powers. I assume that an inanimate thing 
must be physical (that is, public.) Th e diff erence between the two kinds 
of explanation is now that inanimate things have liabilities (inevitably or 
with a certain physical probability) to exercise those powers under cer-
tain circumstances and so to cause eff ects, whereas persons intentionally 
exercise their powers to cause eff ects in the light of beliefs about what 
exercising some power will achieve and the purposes which they seek 
to achieve. Explanation of an event will now consist (in the inanimate 
case) in the occurrence of circumstances under which some substance 
(or substances) was liable to exercise certain powers. Th at a piece of iron 
expanded when heated is explained by it (S) having the power to expand 
(P) and the liability to exercise that power when heated (L), and by (C) it 
being heated. Strictly speaking no law ‘all iron expands when heated’ is 
part of the explanation. Th e ‘law’ is a mere description of the powers etc., 
of all pieces of iron, relevant only because it entails the powers of this 
piece. Explanation of an event by personal explanation will invoke only 
S, P, B, and G; although all these factors might themselves be explained 
(in so far as they can be explained) by an inanimate explanation – e.g. B 
may be explained by the liability (L) of S to have a belief of a certain kind 
under certain circumstances which did in fact occur; and G may be ex-
6 For further argument in defence of the SPL account see pp. 179-85 of my ‘Relations 
Between Universals, or Divine Laws?’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (2006), 
179-89. 
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plained by S’s desire to form such purposes, that is a liability (at least with 
physical probability) to do so. And conversely the factors involved in an 
inanimate explanation might be explained by a personal explanation.
THE CRITERIA OF CORRECT EXPLANATION
I suggest that an explanatory hypothesis (or theory) is rendered probably 
true (or likely to be true) by data (evidence) insofar as (1) the occurrence 
of the evidence is probable if the hypothesis is true and improbable if the 
hypothesis is false, (2) the hypothesis ‘fi ts in’ with any ‘background evi-
dence’ (that is, it meshes with other hypotheses outside its scope which 
are rendered probable by their evidence in virtue of the other criteria), 
(3) the hypothesis is simple, and (4) the hypothesis has small scope.7 Th e 
scope of a theory is a matter of how much it purports to tell us about the 
world, in the extent and precision of its claims. (3) and (4) are features 
internal to a hypothesis, independent of its relation to evidence and so 
determine its prior probability ( probability prior to considering the evi-
dence). While the more the hypothesis claims, the more likely it is to be 
false (which is what the criterion of scope says), simplicity carries more 
weight than scope; scientists consider some theory of enormous scope 
(concerned with the whole universe) probable if it has a relatively simple 
set of laws. Th ere may be no relevant background evidence, and then 
criterion (2) drops out. One case of this is when a hypothesis has a very 
large scope (purports to explain a vast amount) and so there is little if 
any evidence about fi elds beyond its scope. Among large scale theories of 
equal scope, such as theism and rival accounts of why there is a universe 
of our kind, relative probability depends on criteria (1) and (3) alone; 
and so in the case of theories leading us to expect the evidence with the 
same probability (that is, satisfying criterion (1) equally well), on crite-
rion (3) alone. Let me give you two examples – one of each kind of ex-
planation – illustrating how, among theories satisfying the other criteria 
equally well, the simplest theory (simplest in an intuitive sense yet to be 
analysed more precisely) is the one most probably true.
7 For a fuller account of these criteria, but one which does not distinguish the dif-
ferent roles some of them play on the RBU and SPL accounts of laws of nature, see my 
Epistemic Justifi cation, ch 4. 
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Suppose we fi nd among pages recovered from an ancient library three 
pages in similar handwriting of an apparently connected philosophical 
argument. One hypothesis is that the same person wrote all three pages. 
An alternative hypothesis is that each page was written by a diff erent phi-
losopher; all three philosophers had similar handwriting, and thought 
independently of the same argument which they wrote down; but only 
the fi rst page of the fi rst philosopher’s text, the second page of the second 
philosopher’s text, and the third page of the third philosopher’s text have 
survived. Th e two hypotheses are of equal scope – telling us about who 
wrote these pages; and are such as to lead us to expect the data with equal 
probability. But, unless there is relevant background evidence, the fi rst 
hypothesis is obviously more probable in postulating only one person 
writing the pages rather than three. For my second example consider 
a theory which renders probable the same astronomical evidence ob-
served so far as does General Relativity. General Relativity does this (on 
the SPL account) by attributing to stars certain powers and liabilities to 
exercise them dependant on the structure of the spatio-temporal region 
in which they are situated; and it predicts further observations tomorrow 
in virtue of the same powers and liabilities. Th e rival theory claims that 
the liabilities of these things to exercise their powers will depend on the 
structure of their spatio-temporal region in a diff erent way when the ex-
pansion of the Universe causes galaxies to have a certain average distance 
apart (which distance they will attain tomorrow) from the way they de-
pend today. General Th eory is more probable than its rival because (put 
in terms of laws) it consists of only one set of complicated equations 
and so is simpler than its rival which consists of a conjunction of two 
sets of complicated equations. So again simplicity is evidence of truth. 
In so far as General Th eory gets support from other theories of physics 
with which it fi ts, then unless simplicity is evidence of truth, those other 
theories would be just as probable as rival theories adjusted in a similar 
way, and General Th eory’s rival would fi t better with those rivals; and 
so again General Th eory and its rival would be equally probable on the 
evidence. But they are not, and that is because of the crucial role of the 
criterion of simplicity.
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THE NATURE OF SIMPLICITY
Th e assimilation of scientifi c explanation to personal explanation, con-
sequential on adopting the SPL account of laws of nature, makes it pos-
sible to give common criteria of simplicity covering both types. So let’s 
look at what the criterion of simplicity, when used in this way as evidence 
of truth amounts to. It consists of various sub-criteria. First, fewer enti-
ties (alias, substances or objects). Astronomers don’t postulate an extra 
planet, unless thereby their data are made more probable. And the histo-
rian in my earlier example postulates as few philosophers writing texts as 
possible. What constitutes one entity as opposed to two? Entities require 
a certain causal unity to them; they stick together. But whether the parts 
of a physical thing stick together is matter of degree, and it’s not always 
clear when there are two entities rather than one. (For some purposes you 
can treat a double-star system as one entity, for other purposes you must 
treat it as two entities.) But clearly an entity which has no parts is just one 
entity; and as such a very simple one. Secondly, fewer properties attrib-
uted to entities. Don’t postulate a new property possessed by (e.g.) a fun-
damental particle unless it results in a gain of explanatory power. Again, 
the application of this subcriterion depends on how you count properties. 
A property defi ned by similarity to paradigm examples of its application, 
such as ‘green’ or ‘mass’ or ‘bright’ counts as one property; properties 
defi ned as conjunctions or disjunctions of such properties (or as having 
more complicated probabilistic relations to such properties) count as two 
or more properties. It follows from this subcriterion that hypotheses are 
simpler, the more accessible to observation (or experience generally) are 
the properties which they postulate. Th is can be illustrated by the well-
known philosophical example of two theories to account for the colours 
of emeralds. ‘All emeralds are green’ and ‘all emeralds are grue’ (where 
‘grue’ means ‘green before 2050 A.D., or blue thereaft er’) both render the 
data about the colours of emeralds now (in 2010 A.D) available equally 
probable. But the theory ‘all emeralds are green’ is more probable than 
‘all emeralds are grue’, and this is because ‘grue’ is defi ned in terms of an 
accessible property (green) and another property (the date, whose defi ni-
tion in terms of what is accessible clearly has a certain complexity).8
8 But couldn’t there be a being which just recognized things as ‘grue’ without do-
ing so in virtue of their colour and the date? Th ere could certainly be a being which 
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Among the properties of objects are their powers and liabilities, pur-
poses and beliefs. In explaining human behaviour we need to attribute to 
humans as few and as accessible such properties as will suffi  ce to render 
probable their behaviour. And we need to attribute to them as few and 
accessible desires and moral beliefs as will explain (at least in part) their 
purposes; and as few and accessible liabilities to acquire beliefs as will 
explain their moral and other beliefs. I illustrate this for the case of pow-
ers. Someone may walk (as far as we can judge, intentionally) one mile 
from A to B one day at 3mph, and two miles from C to D another day 
at 3 mph. But we wouldn’t explain his behaviour on the fi rst day simply 
by his having the power to walk one mile at 3mph on the fi rst day; and 
explain his behaviour on the second day simply by his having the power 
to walk two miles at 3mph on that day. Rather we’d explain both pieces 
of behaviour by his having the power over a period to walk at least two 
miles in a day at 3 mph. Since both previous powers follow from one 
equally accessible property, we attribute the latter to the person; and so 
we believe that in virtue of having the more general power, that person 
will be able to walk at least two miles at 3mph on other occasions. And 
so we seek to attribute to humans powers as few and as accessible as will 
explain their behaviour. Similarily for inanimate things – for example, 
we attribute to fundamental particles as few forces (that is, powers to 
aff ect other substances) as possible.
We explain the exercise of powers by inanimate things by their li-
abilities to exercise those powers. Liabilities are also simpler, the fewer 
the (accessible) properties by which we distinguish them. A power of 
a substance is a power to exercise various amounts of causal infl uence; 
and the liability is a liability to exercise a power, and to exercise some 
particular degree of it under certain contingent circumstances. A body 
may exert more or less gravitational infl uence on another body in virtue 
of its liability to do so being dependent on its mass, the mass of the other 
body, and their distance apart. And an explanation is simpler, the simpler 
classifi ed together (in virtue of their similarity to paradigm examples) the same objects 
as we would call ‘grue’ (on the grounds of their satisfying the stated defi nition). But he 
would be picking out a diff erent property (‘grue*’) which – as far as his experience went 
– was coinstantiated with ‘grue’. Yet there could be no guarantee that the two properties 
individuated in diff erent ways would always coincide. We have no access to the property 
of being grue* and so cannot use it in our explanations of things. 
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the mathematical relations between the degrees of the various proper-
ties and liabilities, and the simpler the mathematical entities involved in 
stating the relations. Such a relation or entity A is simpler than another 
one B, if A is defi ned and so can be understood without reference to B 
but not vice versa. For this reason multiplication is a more complicated 
relation than addition, numerical powers more complicated than mul-
tiplication, and vectors more complicated than scalars; and large fi nite 
integers are more complicated entities than small ones (you can’t under-
stand ‘5’ except as ‘4+1’, but you can understand ‘4’, ‘+’, and ‘1’ without 
understanding the notion of ‘5’); and (as their name implies) complex 
numbers are more complicated than real numbers, real than rational 
numbers, rational numbers than integers. So an explanation which ex-
plains the pressure exerted by a gas on the walls of a container is simpler 
if it makes this depend on only three other quantities (the volume of the 
container, the temperature of the gas, and a constant varying with the 
kind of gas) rather than on four. It is simpler if the relation between the 
variables involves just multiplication as in the Boyle-Charles law pv=KT, 
rather than on exponentials, logarithms and square roots, for example 
p= loge vk-1/2T2. If laws of both kinds satisfi ed the fi rst two criteria equally 
well, a law of the fi rst kind would be more probably true than a law of the 
latter kind. For exponentials, logarithms and powers are defi ned (and 
so can be understood) in terms of multiplication but not vice versa. So 
too a law of gravity – F= mm//r2 is to be preferred to a law F= mm// r2.00 
(ten zeros) 1 if both equally well explain the data (of measurements accurate 
only to a certain degree). 
Likewise with purposes, desires and beliefs. A purpose to visit Lon-
don and a purpose to learn to sky-dive are separate purposes, because 
they are not derivable from one equally accessible general purpose. But 
a purpose to write the fi rst chapter of my book and the purpose to write 
the second chapter of my book are derivable from an equally accessi-
ble purpose to write my book; and that is why the simpler and more 
general description should be attributed to me, given evidence of my 
writing the fi rst chapter and then the second chapter, in the absence of 
counter-evidence. We attribute to persons continuing accessible desires 
(varying with circumstances in a mathematically simple way, which give 
rise to purposes at appropriate times – for example, a desire to eat which 
increases when the person has not eaten for a long time, and decreases 
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aft er eating.) Likewise it is simpler to explain many of my beliefs by such 
general liabilities as the liability (at least with high physical probability) 
to believe what I am told and to acquire beliefs about the location of 
objects in my fi eld of vision, than by separate liabilities for each belief. 
And powers, beliefs, purposes, desires and liabilities are readily acces-
sible properties.
In summary, hypotheses of personal and scientifi c explanation (on 
the SPL account of the latter) are simpler if they postulate fewer sub-
stances, fewer (accessible) properties (including powers and liabilities), 
and mathematically simpler relations between them (including math-
ematically simpler numbers in the statement of these). Th ese features of 
simplicity are features of the simplicity of the actual components (sub-
stances, properties, and the relations between them) of an explanation of 
some phenomenon independently of whether they are operative in other 
similar substances.
NATURAL THEOLOGY
Natural Th eology of a probabilistic kind claims that the most probable 
explanation of the existence of the universe and its most general features 
is that they are caused by God. Th ese most general features include the 
universal operation of simple laws of nature (that is, in terms of the SPL 
account, that every physical object behaves in exactly the same way codi-
fi ed in the simple ‘laws’ of nature), those laws and the initial (or bound-
ary) conditions of the universe being such as to bring about the existence 
of human bodies, and humans being conscious beings, open to a fi nite 
amount of suff ering and having some ability to bear it or alleviate it. 
(I mean by the ‘boundary conditions’ of the universe those general fea-
tures of the universe which, in addition to those captured by ‘laws’ of 
nature, the universe would need to have, if it did not have a beginning, at 
all times if human bodies were to evolve – for example enough matter-
energy.) Th ese general features, the natural theologian’s evidence or data, 
described in terms of the SPL account are the existence of a vast number 
of substances all behaving in the same simple way such as to bring about 
somewhere or other at some time or other subject to some suff ering the 
bodies of conscious humans. Natural theology needs therefore to claim 
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that the hypothesis of theism (that there is a God) satisfi es the criteria of 
correct explanation set out earlier better than does any rival explanation. 
As I wrote earlier, for very wide-ranging theories such as theism and any 
rivals, this will depend only on how well they satisfy criteria (1) and (3). 
Criterion (1) is satisfi ed insofar as the evidence is probable if the hy-
pothesis is true and improbable if the hypothesis is false. I have argued 
elsewhere at some length9 that if there is a God, it is quite probable that 
he would bring about the existence of embodied humans in conditions 
such as we fi nd on earth (including limited suff ering and the possibility 
of bearing or alleviating it) and so that he would bring about those gen-
eral features of the universe just described which are necessary condi-
tions for the existence of such humans. Th e basic reason for this is that 
God being perfectly good will seek to produce good things; humans are 
good things of a unique kind having – unlike God – the power to make 
effi  cacious choices between (limited) good and evil. It is therefore quite 
likely that God will produce them. But humans can only make effi  ca-
cious choices (ones that make a diff erence) if they live in an embodied 
state in an orderly universe where they can predict the eff ects of their 
actions, and that minimally involves a universe with many substances 
of few kinds (protons, electrons etc) with simple powers and liabilities. 
But of course there are innumerable other logically possible hypothe-
ses which satisfy criterion (1) equally well, both hypotheses in terms of 
many or weaker deities, and scientifi c hypotheses to the eff ect that the 
initial conditions of the universe and its laws of nature are ultimate and 
have no further explanation (e.g. in terms of God bringing them about) 
and eventually cause the existence of conscious beings. My concern in 
this paper however is only to discuss how well diff erent such hypotheses 
satisfy the other relevant criterion, criterion (3), the criterion of simpli-
city. I now proceed to inquire, in the light of my analysis of that criterion, 
how well theism satisfi es the criterion of simplicity, and how well any 
rival hypothesis either of a personal or an inanimate (scientifi c) kind 
which satisfi ed criterion (1) to some signifi cant degree would also satisfy 
the criterion of simplicity. 
9 See Th e Existence of God, chs 6-13, and the shorter and simpler book Is Th ere a God? 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), chs 4-7.
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THE SIMPLICITY OF GOD
Th e simplest kind of explanation of the features which I have described 
will be in terms of some one fi rst substance (whether some fi rst chunk of 
matter-energy or a personal creator) which caused, in virtue of its powers 
and liabilities or its powers, beliefs and purposes, the multitude of sub-
stances of a very few kinds with their powers and liabilities. If the uni-
verse had a beginning, the ‘fi rst substance’ would be a substance which 
caused the emergence and evolution of the universe into this multitude 
a fi nite number of years ago. But if the universe has always existed, then 
this ‘fi rst substance’ would be one which everlastingly keeps this mul-
tiplicity of substances in existence with their powers at all moments in 
time. Th eism (as understood by the Christian and similar religions) pos-
tulates a person as the cause of the universe and so provides a personal 
explanation of its existence. Th is person is oft en called ‘God’; though in 
the case of the Christian tradition, we must regard the fi rst substance as 
‘God the Father’ who according to Christianity inevitably brings about 
from all eternity the other two members of the Trinity.10 Other theistic 
religions do not of course have this feature. So can the traditional divine 
properties be construed in such a way that this unique personal sub-
stance, whom in future I will call simply ‘God’, is a simple substance and 
the simplest substance which can perform this explanatory role?
God is one person. So theism is inevitably a simpler theory than 
polytheism. To be a person at all, a substance has to live for a period 
of time, to have some power (to do intentional actions), some choice 
(whether free or not) of which actions to do, and some true beliefs. He 
will have to have some true beliefs about his intentional powers (what he 
can do); otherwise he will not be able to bring about anything intention-
ally. I shall assume that there cannot be a timeless person, and so that any 
10 A simple hypothesis is no less simple for entailing complicated consequences. 
Christianity claims that God the Father inevitably in virtue of his nature brings about 
the other two members of the Trinity, all of whom together constitute one God. (For an 
argument in justifi cation of this Christian claim see my Th e Christian God, especially ch 
8.) But I suggest that arguments to the existence of that one God must proceed via argu-
ments to the existence of one person on whom everything else depends, and so to the 
existence of God the Father, whose postulated properties are the same as those attributed 
to the God of Islam or Judaism.
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person who exists exists and so has his properties at moments of time.11 
If there could be such a person, the simplest kind of person would be an 
everlasting, omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly free person, a person 
to whose length of life, power, true beliefs12, and freedom of choice there 
are no limits; or rather no limits except those of logic, since any descrip-
tion of what all this amounts to has got to be free from contradiction. 
A person is everlasting if he exists at all times, omnipotent if he can do 
all actions, omniscient if he has all true beliefs, perfectly free if he is 
subject to no non-rational desires which infl uence how he chooses to 
act. Th e concepts of length of time, intentional power, belief, choice, and 
infl uence on choice are concepts of properties maximally accessible; we 
are more familiar with paradigm examples of these properties than of 
virtually any other properties. Th e concepts of ‘all’, or ‘unlimited’ (that is 
having no (zero) limits) are concepts far more accessible than concepts 
of particular large numbers. Hence the properties of everlasting life, lim-
itless power, having all true beliefs, being subject to no causal infl uences 
on choice are far more accessible than the properties of living for a par-
ticular large number of years, having a particular large fi nite degree of 
power, having a particular large fi nite number of mostly true beliefs, and 
being subject to fairly few non-rational desires. 
A person P is omnipotent at a time t iff  he has the maximum degree 
of logically possible power. I suggest that that amounts to this: he is able 
at t intentionally to bring about any state of aff airs which it is logically 
possible for anyone at t to bring about (and the description of which 
does not entail that P did not at t bring it about.)13 However the notion 
11 For argument in defence of this claim see my Th e Coherence of Th eism, revised edi-
tion (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 223-9; and Th e Christian God, ch 4 and pp. 137-44. 
12 It is generally agreed that knowledge is true belief not acquired by luck, although 
there are diff erent views about what ‘not acquired by luck’ involves. I shall be arguing 
shortly that all the divine properties which I have been discussing belong to God essen-
tially and so not by luck. So God’s true beliefs will amount to knowledge. It will simplify 
the present discussion if I assume this already established.
13 Philosophers have found it very diffi  cult to analyse an intuitively simple concept 
of omnipotence (maximum logically possible power) in such a way as to avoid various 
paradoxes. For the history of attempts to analyse the concept of omnipotence, see Brian 
Left ow ‘Omnipotence’ in T.P. Flint and M.C. Rae (eds), Th e Oxford Handbook of Philo-
sophical Th eology (Oxford University Press, 2009). I hope that my analysis avoids all such 
paradoxes, but if it doesn’t the concept is a simple one which makes clear the kind of 
qualifi cations which are necessary to avoid paradoxes.
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of having an intentional power or an ability to do some intentional ac-
tion is somewhat unclear. One says that someone has a power or ability 
when asleep, meaning by that that he could exercise it if he was awake 
and tried to do so. One might say that someone has the ability to speak 
French simply because he could learn it if he tried; or even that he has 
the ability to speak Gaelic for the same reason even if he does not believe 
that there is such a language as Gaelic. But clearly he has the power in 
its fullest form if he can exercise it at will, is conscious and knows that 
he can exercise it at will; only his will is preventing him from exercising 
it immediately. So omnipotence, being the maximum possible degree of 
power should be construed as equivalent to the following: a person P is 
omnipotent iff  he is consciously aware of all the states which it is logi-
cally possible for anyone to bring about at t (and the description of which 
does not entail that P did not bring it about); and if he chooses at t to 
bring about any such state, it happens. Given the logical impossibility 
of backward causation, an omnipotent person cannot aff ect the past14 
or the truth of logically necessary truths, which I assume to include the 
fundamental moral truths.15 Hence the choices of an omnipotent person 
can aff ect only contingent future states.
A person P is omniscient at t (in the most natural sense) iff  he knows 
all propositions true at t. I have spelled out being ‘perfectly free’ as be-
ing subject to no non-rational desires infl uencing his choice. Clearly any 
agent who makes a choice is infl uenced by the nature of that choice, what 
it involves, and so by considerations of reason, the apparent goodness 
or badness of the action. To believe that some action is good to do nec-
essarily gives you a desire to do it in proportion to its believed worth. 
Th e apparent good motivates, and the apparently better motivates more. 
What is ruled out by ‘perfect freedom’ are desires to do an action which 
is apparently bad, or ones which are stronger than its apparent worth 
would motivate. Hence a person who is both omniscient and perfectly 
free will be moved to do an action in proportion to its actual goodness. 
God being perfectly free will set himself to do what he believes best; be-
14 Th at is, he cannot aff ect ‘hard facts’ about the past, these being ones whose truth 
conditions are solely in the past.
15 For my reasons for this assumption see for example pp.151-55 of my ‘What Diff er-
ence does God make to Morality’ in R.K.Garcia and N.L.King (eds), Is Goodness Without 
God Good Enough? (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefi eld, 2009).
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ing omniscient (to the extent of knowing all necessary truths and truths 
about the past) he will have true beliefs about what is the best; and being 
omnipotent, he will succeed in doing it. So he will always do the best 
action where there is one. If in some situation there is no unique best 
action (i.e some incompatible action would be equally good, or there 
is an infi nite sequence of incompatible actions, each less good than the 
next member of the series), then God cannot do the best. But his perfect 
freedom will lead him to get as close to that as the nature of the good will 
allow; and that means that if there are several equal best actions he will 
do one of them, and in the infi nite series situation he will do some good 
(and no bad) action. So God will be as good as it is logically possible to 
be, and we may call that ‘perfectly good.’16 So it turns out that God be-
ing ‘perfectly free’ in my sense has the consequence that while he can 
do evil, inevitably he will never exercise the choice to do so. In another 
perhaps equally natural sense of ‘perfectly free’ a perfectly free person 
would be one who could make any logically possible choice including 
doing evil. So why my sense of ‘perfectly free’ rather than the rival sense? 
Because it is a simpler sense. ‘Perfect freedom’ in my sense is simply the 
absence of properties, non-rational desires; ‘perfect freedom’ in the rival 
sense would be a complicating feature of God, because it would involve 
his being infl uenced by non-rational desires which alone make possible 
a choice of evil. So I stick with my sense. 
Frequently, indeed I would have thought in most situations, there will 
be no unique best action for God to do. Surely, even if there were no in-
compatible better action for God to do, it would have been an equal best 
action for God to make (the universe begin in such a way as to cause) the 
planet Uranus to rotate in the same direction as the other planets as to 
rotate in a diff erent direction. And however many planets (in our galaxy 
or in some distant galaxy) containing living organisms God makes, it 
would be better if he makes one more. And so on.
But these defi nitions give rise to a problem, that while there could be 
an everlastingly omnipotent and perfectly free person, and there could 
be an everlastingly omniscient person, everlasting omnipotence plus 
16 William Rowe (among others) has argued that unless God always does an action 
better than any incompatible actions, God cannot be ‘perfectly good’, and so there can-
not be a God of the traditional kind. See his Can God be Free? (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
2006). Like many others, I fi nd this view highly implausible. 
16 RICHARD SWINBURNE
perfect freedom is incompatible with everlasting omniscience. In the ab-
sence of rational considerations relevant to his choice and in the absence 
of any non-rational desires infl uencing that choice a God perfectly free 
and omnipotent would have a free choice of which state of aff airs to bring 
about before the time when the relevant state of aff airs came about. But 
then he would have been free to choose to make any earlier belief about 
how he would choose false, and so only by cosmic luck could all God’s 
beliefs have been true, and beliefs acquired by luck (see note 12) do not 
constitute knowledge. So omnipotence plus perfect freedom are incom-
patible with omniscience understood in the obvious way. On the other 
hand a more restricted kind of omniscience, knowing all truths about 
the past and all necessary truths (including the necessary moral truths17) 
is not merely compatible with omnipotence plus perfect freedom but en-
tailed by them. Th is is because for any past state or any necessary truth, 
there are future states of aff airs which can be defi ned by its relation to 
them, from which it follows that if God is to have the choice of bringing 
about these states, he needs to know all necessary truths and all truths 
about the past. For example, if God is to know that he can choose now 
to bring about a third world war or a prime number of planets greater 
than 7, he has to know that so far there have been only two world wars, 
and that there is a prime number greater than 7. Since omnipotence 
entails knowledge of moral truths, omnipotence plus perfect freedom 
entail perfect goodness; unrestricted omniscience is not necessary for 
this. Omnipotence is the simplest degree of one property necessary for 
a person, perfect freedom is merely the absence of certain complicat-
17 Contingent moral truths are ones made true by a conjunction of a necessary moral 
truth and a contingent non-moral truth. For example, it would be contingently true that 
I ought to pay you £20 if I have promised to pay you £20 (contingent non-moral truth) 
and people ought always to keep their promises (necessary moral truth). Th e contingent 
non-moral truths which, together with necessary moral truths, create contingent moral 
truths are normally truths about the past – truths about past commitments or truths 
about what past evidence shows is likely to happen in future. Hence a being who knew 
all truths about the past and all necessary truths would normally know all moral truths 
about what would be good for him to do now. But insofar as whether an action available 
to such a being who is also omnipotent and perfectly free (in my sense) is good now de-
pends on what is yet to happen (and not merely on what present evidence shows about 
what is likely to happen), then such a being would predetermine the future in order to 
enable him to do what is good now. Hence only the kind of omniscience entailed by om-
nipotence is necessary for God’s perfect goodness.
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ing properties (causal desires) which yield a vast degree of knowledge 
of a simple although not the simplest kind. (‘Simple’ because it is all the 
knowledge possible for a perfectly free and omnipotent person.) On the 
other hand a person omniscient in the full sense which includes know-
ing everything which he would choose to do, could not be perfectly free. 
Indeed he could not be free to any degree. He would be causally prede-
termined at every moment of time to do every future action which he 
would do on each occasion when there is no unique best action for him 
to do. Th at has the consequence that on each such occasion he would be 
subject to a particular non-rational desire (determining and not merely 
infl uencing him) to do this rather than that action (when there would be 
no reason for doing this action rather than that one.) Th is would make 
God a very complicated person. So which is the way of understanding 
omniscience which makes an omnipotent being the simplest kind of per-
son? Th e answer is clearly the restricted kind of omniscience18 which 
allows him also to be perfectly free. 
Th e other divine properties (understood in natural ways) follow from 
the ones analysed above.19 For example, since God is omnipotent, every-
thing else that comes to exist comes to exist because he causes it or allows 
it to exist; hence he is in a natural sense creator of all that is. Being om-
nipotent, he can make things happen anywhere and learn about things 
anywhere without depending on intermediate causes; so in a natural 
sense he is omnipresent, and so is not tied down to a body, and so is not 
physical.
God’s omnipotence is a power and so an intrinsic property. God’s 
omniscience (in the restricted sense) is not a power or a liability20 but 
a categorical state necessary for omnipotence; and it might seem that it is 
18 For fuller discussion of this see Th e Christian God, 150-151.
19 In deriving this restriction I am following the convention of calling a belief about 
the future true now iff  in the future it will be true, even when its truth is not yet inevita-
ble. Th is is a convention which we do not always follow when we talk of a belief ‘not yet’ 
being true. But if we do not count a belief whose truth or falsity is not yet inevitable, as 
not now being either true or false, then God’s omniscience can be construed simply as 
having all true beliefs. I do not however think that it is any less simple to understand only 
beliefs whose truth value is inevitable as having a truth value, than to follow our more 
normal convention.
20 Th us Aquinas: ‘Knowledge in God is not ... a disposition (habitus)’, Summa Th eo-
logiae Ia.14.ad 1.
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not an intrinsic property of God but a relation to other entities because it 
involves possessing (having within oneself) certain objects – all true be-
liefs. If that was the right understanding of omniscience, then of course 
God would certainly not be simple. So all depends on what it is to have 
a certain belief; and it is not, I suggest, possessing an object within one-
self. I suggest that having a belief that p is an intrinsic property and one 
too primitive to be defi ned. But we can show what we are talking about 
when we talk about S’s belief that p by saying that it is the sort of thing 
S would acquire in a certain way (e.g. by S seeing that p, or by someone 
telling S that p) and which makes a certain kind of diff erence to S’s be-
haviour (e.g. if it follows from p, that the way to get x is to do A (and not 
B), and it follows from not-p that the way to get x is to do B (and not A), 
and S has the purpose of getting x, he will do A.) We humans can have be-
liefs about matters about which we are not thinking. I have beliefs about 
what I did when young about which I am not thinking, but they are my 
beliefs in that – if prompted – I could bring them to consciousness. It is 
simpler to suppose that all God’s beliefs are currently before his mind21; 
that he is currently aware of all his knowledge and so beliefs involved in 
his omnipotence follows from my account of his omnipotence, and these 
are the only ones which I am suggesting that he has. Beliefs need not 
be put into words; children have beliefs before they can put them into 
words, and when they acquire language they report that they had those 
beliefs. So I think that the best analogy for God’s beliefs are the beliefs we 
acquire when we look at a scene before our eyes. Merely by looking we 
acquire innumerable beliefs about what objects there are, where they are, 
and what they look like. We are aware of these beliefs, but not as linguis-
tic entities, and not as the brain states which causally sustain the beliefs 
in us. Th e beliefs are there in a fused pre-linguistic state out of which we 
can – if we choose – separate individual beliefs and put them into words 
(e.g. that ‘there is a tree outside the window’.) We see things and acquire 
beliefs about them both as they are now, and (when we look at the stars) 
as they were thousands of years ago. Seeing involves categorizing: in see-
ing a tree I do not merely have a visual impression caused by a tree, but 
I see an object outside the window as a tree. And seeing an object thus 
21 Th us Aquinas: ‘[God] sees everything at once and not successively’, Summa Th eo-
logiae Ia.14.7. 
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categorized inevitably involves seeing its powers – the tree has the power 
to grow, to resist pressure and so on. God’s beliefs are in this way just 
like the beliefs of which we are aware, but they concern the whole of 
the universe and the insides of things us well as their outsides. He sees 
things as they are and as they were. While our beliefs may come to us by 
diff erent causal routes, it is simpler to suppose (as the traditional picture 
supposes) that God’s beliefs come to him only by one route, directly. So 
too God’s wider fused pre-linguistic state of belief is one integrated state 
of himself. It does not consist of separate items within himself, but it is 
a property of himself. 
God’s perfect freedom is, to repeat, merely the absence of the prop-
erty of being infl uenced by non-rational desires. It is always simpler to 
postulate an absence than a presence. It is simpler to suppose that God 
has the divine properties discussed so far essentially; otherwise it would 
be a vast accident that God continued for all time to exist and have these 
properties. By contrast an ordinary human person, although he needs 
some power etc in order to exist, does not need to have some particular 
amount of power in order to be the particular human he is. And it is 
simpler to suppose that God does not have thisness, which would be 
a particularizing feature additional to his properties. (A substance has 
thisness iff  there could be instead of it another substance with all the 
same properties, intrinsic and relational, as it. God would not have this-
ness iff  there could not be instead of the actual God a diff erent God with 
all the same properties, and so all the divine properties discussed so far.) 
But a person who does not have thisness, and for whom not merely hav-
ing power (plus freedom) but having a particular amount of power (plus 
freedom) is essential to his being the person he is, is a person unlike any 
other persons with whom we are familiar. To call such a ‘person’ a ‘per-
son’ is to use the word in a somewhat analogical sense, but one signifi -
cantly similar to the ordinary notion (like an ordinary person, God has 
purposes and beliefs) for God to count as a person in a wide sense. 
My understanding of the divine properties is traditional, except in re-
spect of his being everlasting rather than timeless, and being omniscient 
only in the restricted sense.22 My arguments however have assumed that 
22 Th at God is timeless has been the dominant theological view from at least the 
fourth century onwards. However, in my view the biblical authors thought of God 
as everlasting, and God’s eternity has not been the subject of dogmatic defi nition. 
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there cannot be a timeless person, and purport to show that the simplest 
kind of God would be omniscient only in the restricted sense. Persons 
other than God have more limited degrees of power and knowledge; 
their purposes are not infl uenced solely by their beliefs about what is 
good but by various desires for particular states of aff airs whose strength 
is not always aligned with their beliefs about the goodness of these states. 
Other persons are very particular limited persons. God, defi ned (in the 
way I have spelled out) as an essentially everlasting omnipotent perfectly 
free person lacking thisness is a very simple substance, the simplest kind 
of person whose existence could explain the existence of the universe 
and its very general features. Hence the hypothesis of theism so con-
strued is simpler than any hypothesis explaining the very general fea-
tures of the universe in terms of a god construed in some other way. Th e 
sense in which I am claiming that God is simple is not quite the same as 
the sense in which later medieval theologians claimed that God is simple 
but it is not too far distant from it, at least on a familiar account of what 
that sense was.23
Nelson Pike’s well-known book God and Timelessness (London: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul, 1970) concluded with his remark that he had not been able ‘to fi nd any basis for 
[the doctrine of divine timelessness] in biblical literature or in the confessional literature 
of either the Catholic or Protestant churches’. And it is disputable whether even all west-
ern theologians of the high middle ages were committed to an explicit doctrine of divine 
timelessness – see R. Fox, Time and Eternity in Mid-Th irteenth-Century Th ought (Oxford 
University Press, 2006). As regards omniscience, although there are a number of biblical 
passages which – read in their natural sense – do imply that God does not know infalli-
bly what God or humans will do (e.g. Genesis 6:6, Jonah 3:10, and Revelation 3:5 which 
implies that God may change what is written in the Book of Life), most biblical passages 
imply that God is omniscient in the more natural sense; and the vast majority of subse-
quent Christian tradition is committed to that view. However this matter has not been 
the subject of any defi nition binding on Orthodox, or any defi nition which might be re-
garded by Catholics as infallible apart from the statement of the First Vatican Council 
that ‘all things are open and laid bare to [God’s] eyes, even those which will be brought 
about by the free activity of creatures’. (See N.P.Tanner (ed.), Decrees of the Ecumenical 
Councils (London: Sheed and Ward, 1990), 806.) However, the Council authorised no 
anathema against those who held a rival view; and (as far as I can see) this view is not 
mentioned in the 1992 Catechism of the Catholic Church (London: Geoff rey Chapman, 
1994) which ‘aims at presenting an organic synthesis of the essential fundamental con-
tents of Catholic doctrine’ (p.9). 
23 For that familiar account, which may only be applicable to the later medievals, see 
my Th e Christian God (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), ch 7. For these thinkers God’s 
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Th e enormous simplicity and so prior probability of hypotheses pos-
tulating omni-properties can be illustrated by a simple scientifi c exam-
ple. Newton’s theory of gravitation had three laws of motion (which are 
largely in eff ect defi nitions) and its law of gravity affi  rming of every given 
body, that it has the power to attract every other body in the universe 
with a force proportional to mm//r2 and the liability always to exercise 
that power – from which it follows that each body also has the liability to 
be attracted by every such body with that force. Th ese extensive powers 
and liabilities belong to the tiniest fundamental particle. So the power of 
such a particle extends over physical objects to the ends of the universe 
and that covers quite a range of the extent of God’s power, though of 
course in no way comparable to it in strength; and its sensitivity to other 
physical objects, which we may compare to God’s knowledge of them, 
also extends over quite a range of what God knows about. If there was 
no quantum indeterminism and we could make measurements with in-
fi nite accuracy, merely measuring the movements of one particle could 
tell us an enormous amount about the distribution of massive bodies 
throughout the universe; and measurements on several particles would 
tell everything about this (given the contingent truth of Newton’s the-
ory). Th e considerable probability of Newton’s theory on the evidence 
available in 1689, far greater than that of the infi nite number of rival 
theories which could have been postulated and would have predicted 
the evidence equally well, derives from the enormous simplicity of its 
omni-properties, ones which have considerable similarity to the omni-
properties which theism attributes to God.
THE SIMPLEST INANIMATE EXPLANATION 
OF THE UNIVERSE IS LESS SIMPLE THAN GOD
Could there be a physical object as simple as God (understood in the way 
developed above) which could provide an inanimate explanation of the 
simplicity was a matter of his not having parts, and all his essential properties being the 
same as each other and the same as God. I claim that God has no parts, and that (not hav-
ing thisness) he is whatever instantiates his essential properties. I claim that God has just 
one essential property – everlasting omnipotence – together with the absence of a prop-
erty. For a rather diff erent account of Augustine’s views on God’s simplicity, see Brian 
Left ow, ‘Divine Simplicity’, Faith and Philosophy 23 (2006), 365-380.
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existence of a universe with the very general features described above? 
Th e normal kind of ‘fi rst substance’ postulated by physicists is an extend-
ed substance – a ‘vacuum state’ or a very compressed chunk of matter-
energy. But such a state has parts and so is less simple than God. But 
physical cosmology could postulate one unextended substance, a parti-
cle, as that from which all else evolved (or on which all else depended, if 
the universe did not have a beginning). It would need to be a physical ob-
ject of a certain kind in having certain properties, powers, and liabilities. 
Th e normal kind of physical substance would have powers of particular 
mathematical quantities (such as the attractive and repulsive powers of 
mass and charge) and liabilities to exercise them under certain physical 
conditions. Th ese would need to be fairly specifi c powers and liabilities 
(some mathematically precise mass and charge for example) if they were 
to make it probable that it would bring about a universe with substances 
of few kinds with the same simple powers and liabilities as each other, 
of a human-body producing kind; and this specifi city would make the 
hypothesis of the existence of such a substance more complicated than 
the hypothesis of theism. Th e singularity of the Big Bang would have to 
have all or at least (given a certain amount of indeterminism) most of the 
details of the future development of the universe built into it.
But could we not instead merely suppose that this physical object had 
the power to produce a good universe, and the liability always to exercise 
that power, and that would explain why we exist (because of the goodness 
of humans existing) and the other general features of our universe (the 
details of which were not predetermined but constitute one of the ways 
in which the universe would be good)? Th e power could be exercised by 
producing an appropriate sort of Big Bang. Given my earlier claim that 
laws of nature are to be analysed in terms of the powers and liabilities of 
substances, this is the nearest we can get to John Leslie’s hypothesis that 
goodness has a propensity to exist.24 
However even if such a physical object could do the explanatory 
work, it would not be nearly as simple as God. Like God, it could be es-
sentially unextended, everlasting and lack thisness. Th e physical object’s 
power to create the good would however be a limited power and so less 
simple than omnipotence (which can only be had by a being which can 
24 See his Value and Existence (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1979).
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choose to act). And it would also need another power, the power to pre-
vent any other substance bringing about the bad, and the liability always 
to exercise that power. Th eism does not need a corresponding second 
power and liability, because it follows from divine omnipotence (plus 
perfect freedom) that every other substance only exists and produces 
eff ects insofar as God allows it to do so. Th e liabilities always to exercise 
these powers would be properties of the physical object additional to its 
powers. Yet being physical (and so public), it couldn’t simply have those 
liabilities. A physical object (unless it is the only physical object) must 
have a location – there must be somewhere where it is (relative to other 
physical objects), and that means that there must be some detectable ef-
fects of it in one place which are not detectable elsewhere. (If a physical 
thing is here rather than there, here and not there is where it impedes the 
motions of other objects, or can be detected by a Geiger counter, or from 
where it emits light, or whatever.) So if the fi rst physical substance were 
everlasting and so existed alongside other physical objects, its liability 
to produce eff ects must be manifested more or diff erently in one place 
than others, and that makes that property not a very simple property. (If 
however it ceased to exist aft er the creation of the physical universe, and 
so did not exist alongside other physical objects, it would not be ever-
lasting and so would be less simple than God for a diff erent reason.) So 
the properties of a fi rst physical object (additional to being everlasting, 
unextended, and lacking thisness, which God also has) would make it far 
from being very simple. In addition to the properties common to both 
God and a fi rst physical substance, God would be merely omnipotent 
and perfectly free, but the latter, as we have seen, is simply the absence 
of something – and absence is always simpler than presence. I conclude 
that the powers and liabilities which we would need to ascribe to the 
single particle hypothesis (the simplest kind of inanimate explanation of 
the orderliness of the universe there could be) would be less simple than 
the properties of God – essential everlasting omnipotence (plus perfect 
freedom), from which all the other properties follow. So the hypothesis 
of theism provides a simpler explanation of the very general features of 
the universe than does any inanimate explanation. And it will be evident 
that the primary reason for that is that moral beliefs motivate; and so 
a conscious being needs less in the way of properties than does an inani-
mate one to cause the same eff ects.
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And even if the hypothesis of one physical fi rst substance were just as 
simple as the hypothesis of God, its propensity to create the good could 
not explain certain more particular features of our universe which would 
only be good if they were brought about by God. Vast numbers of reli-
gious experiences apparently of God would not be good unless there is 
a God. Interactive prayer would be deceptive. And our universe contains 
so much suff ering that it would probably be overall a good universe only 
if its creator were to suff er with his creatures25; and that is something 
that only a person can do. I conclude, for two separate reasons that God 
(understood in the way which I have developed) is the simplest kind of 
cause of our universe there could be.
25 See my Th e Resurrection of God Incarnate (Oxford University Press, 2003), 44-45 
for the obligation on a creator to share the suff ering of those whom he causes to suff er for 
the sake of some great good. Th e argument which I use this point to develop here is that 
a good-producing physical object would have to produce a world with less suff ering than 
would a good God who is prepared to share that suff ering with creatures whom he makes 
to suff er for the sake of a great good.
